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A B S T R A C T
To answer the question of how brain pathology aﬀects reasoning about negative emotional content, we ad-
ministered a disjunctive logical reasoning task involving arguments with neutral content (e.g. Either there are
tigers or women in NYC, but not both; There are no tigers in NYC; There are women in NYC) and emotionally
laden content (e.g. Either there are pedophiles or politicians in Texas, but not both; There are politicians in
Texas; There are no pedophiles in Texas) to 92 neurological patients with focal lesions to various parts of the
brain. A Voxel Lesion Symptom Mapping (VLSM) analysis identiﬁed 16 patients, all with lesions to the orbital
polar prefrontal cortex (BA 10 & 11), as being selectively impaired in the emotional reasoning condition.
Another 17 patients, all with lesions to the parietal cortex, were identiﬁed as being impaired in the neutral
content condition. The reasoning scores of these two patient groups, along with 23 matched normal controls,
underwent additional analysis to explore the eﬀect of belief bias. This analysis revealed that the diﬀerences
identiﬁed above were largely driven by trials where there was an incongruency between the believability of the
conclusion and the validity of the argument (i.e. valid argument/false conclusion or invalid argument/true
conclusion). Patients with lesions to polar orbital prefrontal cortex underperformed in incongruent emotional
content trials and over performed in incongruent neutral content trials (compared to both normal controls and
patients with parietal lobe lesions). Patients with lesions to parietal lobes underperformed normal controls (at a
trend level) in neutral trials where there was a congruency between the believability of the conclusion and the
validity of the argument (i.e. valid argument/true conclusion or invalid argument/false conclusion). We con-
clude that lesions to the polar orbital prefrontal cortex (i) prevent these patients from enjoying any emotionally
induced cognitive boost, and (ii) block the belief bias processing route in the neutral condition. Lesions to
parietal lobes result in a generalized impairment in logical reasoning with neutral content.
1. Introduction
Everyday life is aﬀected by our ability to reason; and although the
majority of choices are not structured as problems of formal reasoning,
humans still have to apply principles of rationality to determine which
choices will lead to the desired outcomes. Evidence from experimental
investigations into the reasoning process, however, suggests that a view
of reasoning as a purely logical process is too simplistic: real-world
reasoning depends on various factors such as conclusion believability
(Evans, 2003; Evans et al., 1983) and emotional content (Blanchette
and Caparos, 2013; Goel and Vartanian, 2011; Goel et al., 2017) of
arguments.
While the issue of belief bias has long been recognized in the psy-
chological literature on reasoning (Evans et al., 1983; Wilkins, 1929),
the eﬀect of emotional content has received much less attention
(Blanchette and Richards, 2004; Blanchette, 2006; Goel and Vartanian,
2011). Even within the cognitive neuroscience literature, while a
number of studies have explored the eﬀects of belief bias (Goel et al.,
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2000; Goel and Dolan, 2003a; Tsujii et al., 2010; Tsujii and Watanabe,
2009), studies of the eﬀect of emotions on logical reasoning are rarer
(e.g. Goel et al., 2017; Goel and Dolan, 2003b). However, in the deci-
sion making literature the relationship between emotion and cognition,
has been explored more widely (e.g. Andrade and Ariely, 2009; Bechara
and Damasio, 2005; Hu et al., 2015).
In an early neuroimaging study, Goel and Dolan (2003b) observed
that while the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 44, 8) was acti-
vated during neutral reasoning trials, reasoning with emotionally
charged syllogisms activated bilateral ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC; BA 11/25). Consistent with this ﬁnding, lesion studies have
shown that neurological patients with lesions to left lateral and superior
medial frontal areas are impaired on simple deductive reasoning pro-
blems (Reverberi et al., 2009). More recently it has been shown that
patients with focal lesions to polar/orbital prefrontal cortex (BA 10 and
11) are selectively impaired in reasoning with categorical syllogisms
with emotional content, but not on the same syllogistic forms involving
neutral content (Goel et al., 2017).
The current study builds upon and extends Goel et al. (2017) along
task and methodological lines. In terms of task, we address whether the
results generalize to logical forms beyond categorical syllogisms. In
terms of methodology, rather than pre-selecting patients with lesions in
polar/orbital prefrontal cortex (BA 10 and 11), we subjected 92 patients
with lesions extending to various parts of the brain, to a voxel-based
lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) analysis. This allows us to explicitly
test whether lesions in regions beyond anterior/orbital PFC aﬀect rea-
soning about emotional content.
With respect to logical forms, Goel et al. (2017), following up on
Goel and Dolan (2003a, 2003b), utilized categorical syllogism tasks, as
have many studies of reasoning (Blanchette and Campbell, 2012;
Bonnefond and Van der Henst, 2009; Goel et al., 2017, 2000; Goel and
Vartanian, 2011). Categorical syllogisms test our understanding of
quantiﬁcation and negation (e.g All A are B; All B are C; No A are C). In
the current study we chose to analyse arguments containing disjunctive
operators, such as the following:
A or B but not both/Not A/Therefore B
These arguments test our logical understanding of the ‘exclusive or’
operator (Hurford, 1974; Newstead et al., 1984; Noveck et al., 2002;
Reverberi et al., 2007).
The issue of the speciﬁc nature of the reasoning task is important.
Reasoning is often thought of as a unitary phenomenon, but 20 years of
neuroimaging research on the topic reveals that diﬀerent logical argu-
ment forms recruit diﬀerent neural machinery (Goel, 2007; Goel et al.,
1997; Prado et al., 2011) So, an outstanding question is whether the
role of inferior/orbital PFC in reasoning with emotional content ar-
ticulated in Goel et al. (2017) is speciﬁc to categorical syllogisms or
generalizes beyond them, perhaps to all logical reasoning forms.
Given that Goel et al. (2017) postulated a reasoning independent
role for polar orbital PFC, we hypothesized that patients with lesions to
the polar and orbital cortex (mainly BA 10 and BA 11) would be
Fig. 1. Lesion overlay of all 92 patients. The colour bar indicates the number of patients with lesion in that area. Images are shown following radiological convention
(Left = Right, Right = Left).
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selectively impaired in disjunctive reasoning with emotional content but
not with neutral content.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were drawn from the Phase III of the Vietnam Head
Injury Study (VHIS) registry. This registry contains data from Vietnam
war veterans who served in Vietnam in the late 1960's and early 1970's
(Barbey et al., 2012; Grafman et al., 1988; Koenigs et al., 2009;
Raymont et al., 2010). Ninety-two Vietnam War veterans with focal
brain lesions due to penetrating shrapnel wounds completed the task.
Twenty-three Vietnam War veterans, with combat experience, but
without brain injury, also completed the task and served as normal
controls. The two groups were matched in terms of age, education, and
cognitive assessment scores (see Section 2.3). The lesion volumes of the
patient group ranged from 1 cc to 97.13 cc, but were not larger than 75
cc on a single hemisphere. Thirty-eight patients had unilateral focal
lesions to the right hemisphere, 31 had unilateral focal lesions to the
left hemisphere, and 23 patients had bilateral focal lesions. The location
of lesions varied between patients, although the majority showed pre-
frontal, temporal or parietal damage. It should be noted that not all
brain areas were aﬀected by lesions, in particular, left lateral PFC (BA
44, 45) was largely spared in this cohort of patients. A lesion overlay
map is provided in Fig. 1. The language, motor and sensory functions of
the patients were suﬃciently intact to take part in the experiment (see
also Section 2.3 for details).
2.2. Lesion assessment
Patients CT axial scans without contrasts were acquired at Bethesda
Naval Hospital on a GE Medical Systems Light Speed Plus CT scanner in
helical mode (150 slices per subject, ﬁeld of view covering head only).
Images were reconstructed with an in-plane voxel size of .4× .4mm,
overlapping slice thickness of 2.5 mm, and a 1mm slice interval. A
trained neuropsychiatrist (V.R.) with clinical experience in neu-
ropsychological testing manually traced lesions in all relevant slices of
the CT scan images in native space. Following this another investigator
(J.G.), blind to the results of the psychological testing, reviewed the
lesions for consensus.
Spatial normalization to a CT template brain in MNI space was
achieved stepwise: ﬁrst, all non-brain tissue was automatically removed
using the BET algorithm in MEDx (Medical Numerics). Following this,
the automated image registration (AIR) algorithm (Woods et al., 1993)
using a 12-parameter aﬃne linear transformation was applied to in-
dividual brain volumes allowing for translation, rotation, scaling and
shearing to normalize the volume to a reference template volume of an
MRI of a 27-year-old normal male, which was later transformed to
Talairach space using a 12-parameter aﬃne linear transformation. The
lesion voxels in the normalization process were not included. Lesion
location and volume were determined from CT images using the Ana-
lysis of Brain Lesion software (ABLe; Makale et al., 2002; Solomon
et al., 2007) contained in MEDx v3.44 (Medical Numerics) with en-
hancements to support the Automated Anatomical Labelling atlas
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). The resulting normalised lesion mask
was used in the VLSM analysis for each subject.
2.3. Cognitive assessment
To assess the patients’ cognitive, emotional and psychological
functioning, an extensive battery of tests was administered to all par-
ticipants. The ones deemed most relevant for our purposes are the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 2008)), the
Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997)) the Beck's De-
pression Inventory (BDI) and the Structural Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV (SCID). These results are reported in Table 1. In addition, pre-injury
intelligence was assessed with the Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test
(AFQT-7A) taken by each (non-oﬃcer) participant upon their entry into
the military. This test has been standardised within the U.S. military
and the scores are found to be highly positively correlated with WAIS
IQ scores (Grafman et al., 1988). The scores from this test are given as
percentiles (Table 1). All the patients were right-handed males aged
between 52 and 70 years with similar years of formal education
(Table 1).
To investigate whether there were any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
cognitive baseline evaluation between the 92 patients and normal
controls, independent t-test were performed on the above mentioned
measures. Only years of education showed a trend level advantage for
patients compared to normal controls (Mean = 15.11, SD = 2.23 vs.
Mean = 14.23, SD = 1.97), but this diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant (t
(108)= 1.69, p= .093, 95% CI [− 0.06, 1.82], Cohen's ds = .322).
Other measures did not reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the 92
patients and 23 normal controls (t(112)≤ 1.39, p≥ .167, Cohen's ds
= .260).
2.4. Task and procedure
Participants were presented with 8 exclusive disjunctive arguments
distributed among 64 arguments of other argument types including,
implication, conjunction, and categorical syllogisms. Half of each type
of argument contained emotional negative content, and other half
neutral content. Exclusive disjunctions were constructed along the fol-
lowing lines:
Premise 1: “Either there exist pink elephants or white mice, but not
both.”
Premise 2: “There are no white mice.”
Conclusion: “There are pink elephants.”
The disjunctions contained 4 emotional trials, and 4 neutral trials.
All emotional content was negatively valanced. Examples of emotional
and neutral exclusive disjunctions can be found in Table 2 (the com-
plete list of items is reproduced in the Supplementary material).
One of the most robust ﬁndings in the psychology of reasoning lit-
erature is the belief bias eﬀect (Evans et al., 1983; Wilkins, 1929). It is
the ﬁnding that the believability of the conclusion aﬀects reasoning
accuracy. Arguments where the validity judgment and conclusion be-
lievability go in the same direction (valid/believable and invalid/un-
believable) are considered to be congruent (see Table 2). Arguments
where the validity judgment and the conclusion believability contradict
(invalid/believable and valid/unbelievable) are referred to as incon-
gruent (see Table 2). Accuracy rates for congruent arguments are much
higher than accuracy rates for incongruent arguments (Evans et al.,
1983). Therefore the arguments were counterbalanced to include an
even number of congruent (believable/valid and unbelievable/invalid)
and incongruent items (unbelievable/valid and believable/invalid). As
a result, there were two congruent emotional trials, two incongruent
Table 1
Demographic and assessment data for patients and normal controls. Mean
percentiles (SD) are provided for Pre-injury IQ (AFQT-7A) and means for the
rest of the results.
Patients Normal controls
N 92 23
Age 58.17 (2.51) 58.69 (2.96)
Education (years) 14.91 (2.31) 14.23 (1.97)
Verbal IQ (WAIS) 106.16 (13.34) 104.61 (10.17)
Performance IQ (WAIS) 101.13 (14.81) 106.13 (11.41)
Full Scale IQ (WAIS) 104.59 (13.31) 105.61 (8.39)
Working Memory (WMS) 101.17 (12.92) 104.57 (13.06)
Pre-injury IQ (AFQ T-7A) 61.47 (25.24) 62.05 (21.04)
BDI 8.47 (8.60) 10.22 (8.96)
SCID 75.87 (13.73) 73.87 (11.38)
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emotional trials, two congruent neutral trials and two incongruent
neutral trials. The selected valid or unbelievable presentation order of
the neutral and emotional disjunctions was counterbalanced between-
subjects, and the order of disjunctions within neutral or emotional
content was randomised. The stimuli were presented on a computer
screen (pixel resolution 512× 384) with SuperLab v1.5 Software.
The concept of validity and the task was explained to participants
both conceptually and with concrete examples. The explanation and
examples continued until the experimenter was satisﬁed that the par-
ticipant understood the notion of validity and the task. Task instruc-
tions then appeared in writing.
The experiment had three parts. In the ﬁrst part, participants were
shown two premises and a conclusion and asked to determine if the
latter followed from the former. If it did, participants had to press the
designated “yes” key, and if not, they had to press the designated “no”
key. Each trial remained on screen until participants responded. Their
response triggered the next trial. Participants were encouraged to be as
accurate and as quick as possible, but there were no time constraints.
All participants completed all the trials. After completion of the rea-
soning task, participants were given a break with no time constrains.
In the second part of the experiment, the conclusions (3rd sentence)
of the logical arguments from the ﬁrst part were presented on the
screen, and the participants were asked to rate the believability of the
sentence on the scale from 1 to 5, where 1-represented very un-
believable and 5-represented very believable. These ratings were used
to control for the belief bias eﬀect (see Section 2.5). Another rest period
followed part two.
In the third part, the conclusions of the arguments were re-pre-
sented and the participants were asked to judge each conclusion on its
emotional arousal on the scale from 1 to 4 (1 – negative emotion/high
arousal, 2 – negative emotion/low arousal, 3 – positive emotion/high
arousal, 4 – positive emotion/low arousal).
2.5. Belief bias reclassiﬁcation
Given the importance of the belief bias eﬀect, we counterbalanced
the reasoning material for congruent and incongruent trials, as noted
above. However, this balancing is only eﬀective insofar as participants
share our beliefs about the conclusions. To overcome this issue the
reasoning items were re-classiﬁed after the experiment based on each
participants’ actual belief rating for each of the conclusions. This was
done to ensure that the congruency and incongruency classiﬁcations
were made based on the participants’ actual beliefs, rather than our
beliefs.
For all trials where participants indicated a belief rating of 3, the
initial congruency classiﬁcation was maintained, but the invalid trials
which participants indicated to be unbelievable (ratings of 1 and 2) and
valid trials that were rated believable (4 and 5) were classiﬁed as
congruent. Conversely, ratings of 1 and 2 for valid trials and ratings of 4
and 5 for invalid trials were classiﬁed as incongruent. The average
number of congruent and incongruent trials remained relatively ba-
lanced after the adjustment (i.e., neutral congruent vs. neutral incon-
gruent = 1.25 (0.46) vs. 2.75 (0.46); emotional congruent vs. emo-
tional incongruent = 1.96 (0.46) vs. 2.03 (0.46).)
2.6. Data analysis
2.6.1. VLSM
We began by performing a VLSM analysis, using non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U test, (with automated anatomical labelling (AAL)) in
ABLe on all patients (Solomon et al., 2007). VLSM analyses associate
behaviour with lesion site, on a voxel-by-voxel basis, by grouping pa-
tients into those who show a lesion in a particular voxel and comparing
their behavioural task performance with that of all other patients
(Solomon et al., 2007). Non-parametric tests were used due to the small
number of trials in each task condition – only 4 trials in emotional and 4
in neutral content – and an abnormal distribution of behavioural scores
according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests (as has been
done previously by e.g. Brosig, 2002; Falk et al., 2005). For the current
study, three behavioural measures were entered into the analysis: mean
correct responses for all exclusive disjunctions, mean correct responses
for emotional trials, and mean correct responses for neutral trials.
A false-discovery rate (FDR) correction of .05 was applied for
multiple comparisons. The minimum cluster size was set to 10 voxels
and only those voxels where at least three patients showed overlapping
lesions were used for the analysis.
2.6.2. ANOVA
As VLSM analysis in ABLe only allows for simple t-tests, we un-
dertook a second level analysis in which we incorporated the normal
controls and broke down the behavioural scores to include the belief
bias eﬀect, resulting in a Group (PFC, parietal, NC) by Content (Neutral,
Emotional) by Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) mixed design. We
used the R-package for nonparametric ANOVA-type statistics analysis
(nparLD function, Noguchi et al., 2012) and further analysis of the in-
teractions was explored with a non-parametric mixed-design Friedman's
ANOVA (Field et al., 2012). The dependent variable was correct re-
sponse to the reasoning task in the various conditions. Signiﬁcant main
eﬀects and interactions were followed-up by non-parametric post hoc
tests; between-subject diﬀerences were explored with planned Mann-
Whitney U tests adjusted for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni-cor-
rected, alpha = 0.017, two-tailed). Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests were
used for evaluating within-subject diﬀerences. Given the small number
of stimuli per category, exact p-values (Monte Carlo simulation) for
each post hoc test were computed and are provided in addition to the
asymptotic p-values (Mehta and Patel, 2011). Nonparametric test eﬀect
sizes were measured as suggested by Tomczak and Tomczak (2014) and
parametric tests eﬀect sized were calculated according to Lakens
(2013). Non-signiﬁcant results were summarised by reporting the clo-
sest one to signiﬁcance, for example: t(31)= 1.98, p= .057, Cohen's ds
= .69, and t(31)= 0.98, p= .335, Cohen's ds = .34, would be reported
as t(31)≤ 1.98, p≥ .057, Cohen's ds ≤ .69. Finally, to ensure that our
patient results were not driven by a few individuals, we checked for
outliers in our three groups (PFC patients, parietal lobe patients, normal
controls). No outliers were found.
3. Results
3.1. VLSM patients only analysis
The VLSM analysis with automated anatomical labelling (AAL) in-
dicated signiﬁcant results for the emotional content trials. Analysis
revealed that only patients having lesions mainly to the left and right
frontal lobes (Talairach coordinates [− 16, 40, − 16], [16, 38, − 22],
and [8, 58, − 6], N= 16; Fig. 2A and Table S1) performed poorly in
Table 2
Examples of emotional and neutral exclusive disjunctions by content.
Emotional disjunction Neutral disjunction
Congruent Either in Korea there are edible
dogs or opossums, but not both.
Either there are Christians or
atheists in America, but not
both.
In Korea there are no opossums. There are no Christians in
America.
In Korea there are edible dogs. There are no atheists in
America.
Incongruent Either there are paedophiles or
politicians in Texas, but not
both.
Either there exist pink
elephants or white mice, but
not both.
There are politicians in Texas. There are no white mice.
There are no paedophiles in
Texas.
There are pink elephants.
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emotional exclusive disjunctions compared to other patients (Table 4).
As indicated in Fig. 2A and Table S2 (Supplementary material), all of
these 16 patients have lesions largely conﬁned to BA 10 and BA 11.
VLSM analysis also identiﬁed another patient group of 17 patients
who were impaired on neutral exclusive disjunctions compared other
patients (Table 4). As noted in Fig. 2B and Table S2, these patients had
lesions largely conﬁned to right parietal areas (BA 7 & 40, Talairach
coordinates [46, − 50, 28] and [24, − 62, 32], N=17). These results
indicate a double disassociation between the two patient groups as
determined by the VLSM analysis (Fig. 3).
The cognitive baseline scores and volume loss data for these two
patient groups (and normal controls)1 is presented in Table 3. To con-
trol for possible confounding variables, potential diﬀerences between
the two patient groups (polar/orbital PFC, parietal lobe) with respect to
education, BDI, SCID, pre-Injury IQ, WAIS Verbal IQ, Performance IQ
and Full IQ, WMS Working Memory Primary Index Scores, and overall
lesion volumes (cubic centimetres) were tested with an independent t-
test for each measure separately. T-test results showed no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the two patient groups in all these measures (t
(31)≤ 1.98, p≥ .057, Cohen's ds ≤ .69; Table 3).
We also compared the cognitive baseline scores of normal controls
and the two patient groups (polar/orbital PFC, parietal lobe) with one-
way ANOVAs, for each measure separately. ANOVA results showed no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the three participant groups in any of
these measures (F(2, 55) ≤ 2.55, p≥ .088, ηp2 ≤ .08; Table 3).
3.2. ANOVA including normal controls and belief bias
To compare the performance of patients with normal controls, and
to explore the eﬀect of belief bias, we added normal controls to Group,
separated the reasoning trials into Congruent and Incongruent items,
and carried out nonparametric ANOVA-type statistics (ATS) with
Fig. 2. Lesion overlay maps for patients displayed on the VOTL Atlas found in ABLe software with overlap threshold of 2. (A) Slices 12 – 59 of polar/orbital PFC
lesion patients group (n= 16); (B) Slices 24 – 71 of parietal lesion patients group (n= 17). Images are presented in radiological convention (Left = Right, Right =
Left).
1 Not used in the VLSM analysis.
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between subject factor Group (NC, polar/orbital PFC, PL) and within-
subject factors Content (Emotional and Neutral) and Congruency
(Congruent and Incongruent) and a dependent variable of accuracy.
The results with non-parametric ANOVA-type statistics indicated the
main eﬀects of Congruency and of Content to be signiﬁcant (ATS(1)
= 22.61, p≤ .001, and ATS(1) = 9.95, p= .002, respectively). The
Group by Content interaction was also signiﬁcant (ATS(1.94) = 7.07,
p= .001) as well as three-way Group by Content by Congruency in-
teraction (ATS(1.67) = 5.68, p= .006). The main eﬀect of Group, and
Congruency by Content, and Group by Congruency interactions were
not signiﬁcant (ATS(1.93) = 2.35, p= .11, ATS(1) = 2.61, p= .11,
and ATS(1.87) = 1.57, p= .21, respectively). The accuracy scores for
each condition are reproduced in Table 4 and Fig. 4. These scores are
consistent with those reported in the literature, on similar disjunctive
reasoning tasks with normal, healthy, university student participants
(García-Madruga et al., 2001; Reverberi et al., 2007).
To explore the signiﬁcant three way interaction, reasoning trials
were separated into Congruent and Incongruent and analysed sepa-
rately.
3.2.1. Congruent trials
A 2×3 Friedman's non-parametric mixed design ANOVA with a
within-subject factor Content (Emotional and Neutral) and a between-
subject factor Group (NC, polar/orbital PFC, PL) for Congruent items
indicated no signiﬁcant main eﬀects of Group (Q= 2.50, p= .121) and
Content (Q = 0.39, p= .542), as well as no signiﬁcant Group by
Content interaction (Q = 0.60, p= .564; Fig. 4).2
3.2.2. Incongruent trials
Friedman's ANOVA for the Incongruent trials revealed signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of Content (Q = 9.44, p= .005) as well as a signiﬁcant
Content by Group interaction (Q = 10.93, p≤ .001; Fig. 4), but the
main eﬀect of Group was not signiﬁcant (Q = 0.52, p= .604). Post-hoc
comparisons for Emotional Content accuracy rates showed a sig-
niﬁcantly lower accuracy for polar/orbital PFC vs. PL (U = 69.50,
p= .011, exact p= .010, r= .441) and a trend signiﬁcance vs. NC (U
= 106.00, p= .019, exact p= .020, r= .375, Bonferroni corrected
two-tailed alpha< .017; Table 4). There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between PL and NC (U = 180.50, p= .640, exact p= .682, r= .074).
By contrast, in the Neutral content condition there was a signiﬁcantly
higher accuracy for polar/orbital PFC patients vs. PL patients (U =
70.00, p= .014, exact p= .013, r= .426) and vs. NC (U = 91.50,
p= .006, exact p= .006, r= .437), but no signiﬁcant diﬀerence be-
tween PL patients and NC (U = 193.50, p= .955, exact p= .976,
r= .009).
The within group comparisons between Emotional Incongruent and
Neutral Incongruent trials revealed a signiﬁcant increase in accuracy
rates from Neutral to Emotional trials for the NC group (Z=− 3.12,
p= .002, exact p= .001, r= .651) and for the PL group (Z=− 2.57,
p= .010, exact p= .008, r= .623). The decrease in accuracy from
Neutral to Emotional trials for the polar/orbital PFC group was not
signiﬁcant (Z=1.83, p= .067, exact p= .073, r= .458).
The results split by argument validity (valid and invalid) are pre-
sented in Supplementary Fig. S1. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that results are
not driven by a bias to reject arguments when the content is emotion-
ally negative.
3.3. Response times
In order to evaluate if negative emotional content encouraged
longer deliberations, a nonparametric ANOVA-type statistics (ATS)
with between subject factor Group (NC, polar/orbital PFC, PL) and
within-subject factors Content (Emotional and Neutral) and
Congruency (Congruent and Incongruent) and a dependent variable of
response time for accurate trials was carried out. However, the analysis
indicated no signiﬁcant main eﬀects or interactions (ATS(1) ≤ 2.93,
p≥ .086).
3.4. Belief strength and emotional arousal
The possibility that the polar/orbital PFC groups’ impaired perfor-
mance on the Emotional trials might be due to stronger (or weaker)
participants’ belief or emotional arousal by the reasoning items was
explored further.
Fig. 3. Mean accuracy rates (± 1 SEM) for the groups determined by VLSM
analysis as a function of argument content.
Table 3
Clinical and demographic information (SD) from polar/orbital (PFC), parietal
lobe (PL) and normal controls (NC) samples.
PFC PL NC
Number of Patients 16 17 23
Age (years) 57.50 (1.15) 59.00 (3.10) 58.69 (2.96)
Education (years) 14.13 (2.53) 15.56 (2.12) 14.22 (1.97)
Pre-injury IQ (AFQ T-7A) 57.31
(26.01)
62.13
(26.65)
62.05 (21.04)
WAIS
Verbal IQ 102.63
(7.61)
108.76
(9.98)
104.61
(10.17)
Performance IQ 103.60
(9.91)
101.41
(14.94)
106.13
(11.41)
Full Scale IQ 104.00
(6.14)
106.76
(12.09)
105.61 (8.39)
WMS Working Memory
Primary Index Score
100.20
(11.69)
103.41
(12.56)
104.56
(13.05)
BDI 8.69 (8.28) 7.00 (6.18) 10.22 (8.96)
SCID 79.44
(11.99)
78.41 (9.08) 73.87 (11.38)
Total Volume Loss (cc) 41.15
(26.49)
38.47
(27.69)
0
WAIS =Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; WMS =Wechsler Memory Scale;
BDI =Beck Depression Inventory; SCID-GAF = Structural Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV – Global Assessment Function; PFC =Polar/Orbital Prefrontal
Cortex; PL =Parietal Lobe; NC =Normal Controls.
2 Although the main eﬀects and interaction were not signiﬁcant in the
Congruent condition, visual inspection of graph Fig. 4B hints at possible be-
tween group diﬀerences in Neutral Content Congruent trials. Further in-
vestigation revealed borderline signiﬁcance between polar/orbital PFC and
Normal Controls (U = 116.00, p= .17, exact p= .016, r= .381 (Bonferroni
corrected alpha< .017), a trend between Parietal and Normal Controls (U =
141.50, p= .060, exact p= .062, r= .298), and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence be-
tween polar/orbital PFC and Parietal patients (U = 125.50, p= .676, exact
p= .709, r= .073). There was no trend between group diﬀerences with Emo-
tional Content trials (p≥ .119).
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3.4.1. Belief strength
At ﬁrst the mean belief rating for all disjunctions was calculated
separately for each participant and then compared between groups. The
between group analysis showed that there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in belief strength between the groups (χ2 (2) = 0.558, p= .757, exact
p= .761, Cramer's V = .075). Subsequently, belief ratings for conclu-
sions intended to be true and conclusions intended to be false were also
compared. Analysis did not identify any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the groups (true conclusion: χ2 (2) = 0.949, p= .622, exact p= .626,
Cramer's V = .098; false conclusion: χ2 (2) = 0.198, p= .906, exact
p= .905, Cramer's V= .045). Finally, the comparison of belief strength
between Congruent and Incongruent trials in Emotional and Neutral
trials did not show any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between groups (χ2 (2)
≤ 2.23, p≥ .328, exact p≥ .334, Cramer's V ≤ .141).
3.4.2. Emotional arousal
For each valance/arousal category (negative aroused, positive
aroused, negative calm, positive calm) the proportion of the number of
emotional trials rated in a speciﬁc category to the number of related
emotional trials was calculated for each participant for all Emotional
trials and for Congruent and Incongruent Emotional trials (as done by
Goel et al., 2017). For example, if participants provided rating for all 4
trials, and 1 trial was “negatively calm”, the proportion of these type of
trials would be 1 out of 4, or .25. Following this, the group diﬀerences
in the mean proportion of ratings of each valance/arousal categories
were investigated. The mean proportion rating for each valance/arousal
category did not reveal any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between groups in
overall Emotional trials (χ2 (2) ≤ 2.27, p≥ .321, exact p≥ .339, Cra-
mer's V ≤ .152). Emotional Incongruent and Emotional Congruent
trials showed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the groups in negative
aroused, positive aroused, negative calm, positive calm categories (χ2
(2) ≤ 4.41, p≥ .110, exact p≥ .114, Cramer's V ≤ .212).
Taken together, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in belief strength
or emotional arousal between the groups that could have aﬀected their
performance.
3.5. Correlational analysis
To investigate the associations between performance on Emotional
and Neutral content trials (overall and separated by congruency) and
percentage volume loss (collapsed across hemispheres), non-parametric
Spearman's correlation analysis was performed separately for polar/
orbital PFC and parietal lobe patients. Correlation of polar/orbital PFC
patients’ accuracy scores in congruent neutral, congruent emotional,
incongruent neutral, and incongruent emotional with volume loss in BA
10 and BA 11 did not show any signiﬁcant results. The equivalent
analysis for parietal lobe patients’ lesion volume loss in BA40 and BA 7
also did not result in any signiﬁcant correlations.
Fig. 4. Mean accuracy rates (± 1 SEM) for (A) Exclusive Disjunction items, (B) Exclusive Congruent Disjunction items and (C) Exclusive Incongruent Disjunction
items as a function of Content (Emotional, Neutral) and group (polar/orbital (PFC), parietal lobe (PL), normal controls (NC)).
Table 4
Mean (SD) accuracy for emotional and neutral content overall, congruent and incongruent trials for polar/orbital PFC (PFC), parietal lobe (PL) and normal controls
(NC) samples.
Emotional Neutral
Congruent Incongruent Overall Congruent Incongruent Overall
polar/orbital PFC 0.73 (0.34) 0.43 (0.36) 0.58 (0.24) 0.64 (0.43) 0.67 (0.27) 0.66 (0.14)
PL 0.84 (0.25) 0.76 (0.36) 0.79 (0.22) 0.69 (0.43) 0.38 (0.30) 0.53 (0.23)
NC 0.88 (0.20) 0.72 (0.37) 0.79 (0.22) 0.92 (0.18) 0.38 (0.25) 0.65 (0.15)
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4. Discussion
The current study investigated the eﬀect of polar/orbital PFC and PL
lesions on exclusive disjunctive reasoning with emotional and neutral
content. The main result is a double dissociation between polar/orbital
PFC and parietal lobes for emotional and neutral reasoning shown by
the VLSM analyses. Patients with polar/orbital PFC lesions were im-
paired in the emotional content reasoning trials but not the neutral
content reasoning trials. Patients with PL lesions displayed the reverse
pattern. Normal controls provided a baseline for expected performance.
Patients with PL lesions performed at the same level as normal controls
in the emotional condition (but not in the neutral condition), and pa-
tients with lesions to polar/orbital PFC performed at the same level as
normal controls in the neutral condition (but not in the emotional
condition).
These results cannot be explained by group diﬀerences in age and
education, nor by cognitive or emotional baseline scores, as the polar/
orbital PFC and parietal lobe patients did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer on
these measures from each other, or from normal controls. Other pos-
sibilities to account for these results might be group diﬀerences in be-
lievability of the argument conclusions (via the belief bias eﬀect), or the
emotional perception/impact of arguments. However, the data indicate
no diﬀerences along these two dimensions.
A similar double dissociation was reported in a neuroimaging study
involving categorical syllogisms with neutral content and negative
emotional content (Goel and Dolan, 2003b). A content type (neutral,
emotional) by task (reasoning, baseline) interaction revealed activation
in medial ventral PFC for reasoning with negative emotional content,
and activation in lateral/dorsal lateral PFC in reasoning with neutral
content. The medial ventral PFC activation overlaps with the lesions
displayed by our polar/orbital PFC patients, and these patients are in-
deed impaired in their ability to reason about emotional content, but
not neutral content. The fact that patients with polar/orbital PFC le-
sions were unaﬀected in the neutral reasoning condition is consistent
with many neuroimaging and patient studies that have failed to im-
plicate this region in formal logical reasoning tasks (Baggio et al., 2016;
Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011; Reverberi et al., 2012).
However, in the neutral condition, it is patients with lesions to the
parietal lobes that are impaired. There are two possible reasons for this
divergence in results between Goel and Dolan (2003b) and the present
study. First, as noted above, our patient pool contained very few pa-
tients with lesions to left lateral PFC. Second, whether the parietal lobes
or left PFC involved in reasoning with neutral content is a function of
the logical forms of the argument and the presence (or absence) of
meaningful content (Prado et al., 2011; Goel, 2007). In the case of
categorical syllogisms with meaningful content that participants have
beliefs about, it is a left lateral PFC and temporal system that is largely
engaged (Prado et al., 2011; Goel, 2007).3 By contrast, transitive rea-
soning arguments engage the parietal lobes much more than the frontal
lobes (Prado et al., 2011; Goel, 2007). There is little data about the
neural systems underlying disjunctive reasoning. However, one study
has reported stronger activation in left BA 40 in disjunctive reasoning
than in conditional reasoning (Reverberi et al., 2007). This suggests a
simple story of two separate reasoning mechanisms, one for emotional
content, located in polar/orbital PFC, and one for neutral content, lo-
cated in parietal lobes (at least for disjunctive arguments) that are se-
lectively damaged in these patients.
However, when the results are further broken down to incorporate
belief bias eﬀects, a more complex story emerges. In articulating this
story, we are assuming some form of a dual mechanism theory of logical
reasoning (Evans, 2003). Dual mechanism accounts assume two sepa-
rate systems for logical reasoning. There is a (fast, automatic) belief-
based system for reasoning about familiar material that one has beliefs
about. There is a second, (slow, eﬀortful) formal reasoning system that
is engaged when one is dealing with abstract, or unfamiliar material,
that one does not have beliefs about. But most real-world reasoning
involves familiar content. Whenever familiar content is involved, one
will always encounter congruent and incongruent trials. In incongruent
trials belief-based responses and logic-based responses can be diﬀer-
entiated. Responses based on believability of the conclusion lead to
incorrect results. Correct responses are therefore indicative of (i) de-
tection of a conﬂict between the believability of the conclusion and the
validity of the argument, (ii) suppression of the prepotent belief-based
response, and (iii) a formal evaluation of the argument. By contrast, in
congruent trials belief-based responses and logic-based responses lead
to the same correct conclusion, so are diﬃcult to disentangle, though
one might expect formal reasoning to lower accuracy.
One important result in the incongruent condition in the present
study is a signiﬁcant improvement of normal controls (and PL patients)
in emotional content reasoning trials (Fig. 4C). Although it is commonly
assumed that emotion hinders reasoning, some studies suggest that it
can also be enhanced by negative emotional content (Blanchette et al.,
2007; De Jong et al., 1997; Gangemi et al., 2013; Goel and Vartanian,
2011). Studies by Blanchette et al. (2007) and Goel and Vartanian
(2011) have shown that normal healthy participants are overall more
accurate on negative emotional incongruent trials compared to neutral
incongruent trials in categorical syllogism tasks. One possible ex-
planation for such results is that emotions may serve to attenuate belief
bias eﬀects.4 Negative emotionally charged sentences are not simply
true or false, but are also subject to social approbation/disapprobation.
This may warrant extra vigilance and recruitment of greater cognitive
resources (attention and working memory allocation), which may im-
prove reasoning performance by reducing reliance on belief bias, par-
ticularly in incongruent trials. In the case of the normal controls and
parietal patients (with intact polar/orbital PFC), the emotional material
triggers extra vigilance and allocation of greater cognitive resources,
resulting in more systematic information processing.
The other important result from the analysis of the incongruent
trials is the poor performance of the polar/orbital PFC patients in the
emotional reasoning condition and their better performance in the
neutral reasoning condition (compared to NC and PL patients) (Fig. 4C).
One way of accounting for the former is to simply say that the polar/
orbital PFC lesions preclude these patients from the above emotionally
induced cognitive boost that normal controls and patients with parietal
lobe lesions beneﬁt from. Indeed, the performance of polar/orbital PFC
patients on these emotional trials is very similar to the performance of
NC and PL patients on the neutral incongruent trials. However, this
does not explain how the polar/orbital PFC patients managed to out-
perform both, PL patients and normal controls in the neutral reasoning
condition.
A second possibility is that lesions to polar/orbital PFC prevent
patients from one or more of the following steps: detecting conﬂict,
suppressing the prepotent response, and engaging in formal logical
reasoning. But again, unless we assume that there are diﬀerent me-
chanisms underlying these processes for neutral and emotional rea-
soning, it cannot explain the better performance of these patients in the
neutral reasoning trials (requiring the same steps).
A third possibility is that polar/orbital PFC is a gating/purging
mechanism for emotional content (Goel et al., 2017). On this account,
formal reasoning occurs in lateral PFC and PL systems while conﬂict
detection occurs in right dorsolateral PFC (Goel, 2007). Both of these
systems are intact in the polar/orbital PFC patients (and NC). The input
to these systems needs to be devoid of emotions. If emotional content
leaks through they are unable to cope. This can explain poor
3 In the absence of meaningful content, a bilateral frontal and parietal system
is engaged (Goel, 2007).
4 It is also possible for emotional content to accentuate the belief bias eﬀects,
though there is no evidence of this in the present study.
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performance of the polar/orbital PFC patients in the emotional rea-
soning condition, but again, it cannot explain improved performance of
these patients in the neutral reasoning condition.
The most parsimonious explanation of the enhanced performance of
patients with lesions to polar/orbital PFC in neutral incongruent trials
may be that the lesions are attenuating belief bias eﬀects in the neutral
content reasoning condition. Goel and Dolan (2003b) showed that
failure to detect a conﬂict/or suppress the prepotent response in
(emotionally neutral) incongruent trials, results in a belief bias response
which activates ventral medial PFC. It is possible that lesions to polar
orbital PFC in our patients are resulting in blockage of the belief bias
route in neutral reasoning trials, resulting in more frequent engagement
of formal reasoning processes and increased accuracy in neutral in-
congruent trials.
This account also seems to explain the (nonsigniﬁcant) pattern of
results in the congruent trials (Fig. 4B). The trend towards the polar/
orbital PFC patients underperforming the normal controls in the neutral
congruent trials can be explained with the same mechanism. If the
belief bias route (which leads to the correct answer in this condition) is
impaired, then the formal logic route must be used, leading to an ele-
vated error rate.
So we are suggesting that lesions to polar/orbital PFC do two things:
(i) prevent these patients from enjoying the emotionally induced cog-
nitive boost (that NC and PL patients beneﬁt from), and (ii) block the
belief bias processing route in the neutral condition. There are data to
support both of these roles for polar/orbital PFC in logical reasoning.
For example, Goel and Dolan (2003b) found that emotional (“hot”)
reasoning is associated with increased activation in the bilateral ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex in normal participants, and Goel and Dolan
(2003a) reported that healthy volunteers activated bilateral vmPFC
when giving belief-based responses in incongruent trials.
These results should be interpreted in the context of two caveats.
First, as already noted, our patient population did not provide full brain
lesion coverage. In particular, lesions to left lateral PFC were largely
absent. Thus the study cannot speak to how lesions to these spared
regions may have aﬀected the results. Second, the modest number of
stimuli utilized may have limited the detection power of the follow-up
three way nonparametric analysis undertaken.
With respect to the performance of patients with parietal lobe le-
sions, overall, they do underperform in the neutral condition compared
to the patients with polar orbital PFC lesions (Fig. 4A), but in com-
parison to the normal controls, they underperform (at a trend level)
only in the congruent neutral condition (Fig. 4B). One possible ex-
planation could be attenuation of belief bias eﬀects, a ﬁnding in line
with Baggio et al. (2016). This would result in more formal processing,
and greater potential for errors. However, this explanation is incon-
sistent with their performance in neutral incongruent trials where they
are as susceptible to belief bias eﬀects as the normal controls. One
possibility is that patients with lesions to PL are simply displaying a
generalized impairment in neutral logical reasoning and it is failing to
show up in the neutral incongruent condition due to a ﬂoor eﬀect.
In summary, the current study shows that lesions to polar orbital
PFC selectively impair reasoning on exclusive disjunctive items, with
negative emotional content, compared to both, lesions to the parietal
lobes and normal controls. Lesions to the parietal lobes selectively
impair performance in neutral reasoning trials compared to lesions to
polar orbital PFC. We are reluctant to accept a double dissociation ac-
count of the results due to the fact that the performance of patients with
parietal lobe lesions does not statistically diﬀer from that of normal
controls. Upon breaking down the results in terms of belief bias eﬀects,
we ﬁnd that patients with lesions to polar orbital prefrontal cortex
underperformed in incongruent emotional content trials, and over
performed in incongruent neutral content trials (compared to both
normal controls and patients with parietal lobe lesions). Patients with
lesions to parietal lobes underperformed (at a trend level) in congruent
neutral trials.
We conclude that lesions to polar orbital PFC are having two eﬀects.
In the emotional content condition they are preventing these patients
from beneﬁting from an emotion induced cognitive boost and, in the
neutral condition, they are blocking the belief bias response route and
forcing formal logical evaluation of arguments. Lesions to the parietal
lobes are resulting in a generalized, nonspeciﬁc, impairment to logical
reasoning, in the neutral condition.
The study replicates the ﬁndings of Goel et al. (2017), at least with
respect to the impairment of polar orbital PFC patients in the emotional
reasoning condition.5 This is important for two reasons. First, by per-
forming a whole brain, VLSM analysis, rather than preselecting speciﬁc
patients, we demonstrated that sensitivity to emotional content is spe-
ciﬁc to polar orbital PFC. Second, by using disjunctive reasoning items,
we demonstrated that the eﬀect is not limited to categorical syllogisms,
and may be independent of logical form. The current results also di-
verge from Goel et al. (2017) in ﬁnding a signiﬁcant improvement in
the performance of polar orbital PFC patients in the incongruent neutral
reasoning trials. This ﬁnding results in a modiﬁed explanation of the
role polar orbital PFC in logical reasoning with emotional content.
There is also a new ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant overall impairment in the
performance of patients with parietal lobe lesions in reasoning trials
with neutral content.
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